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Abstract
Present world has already been consistently exploring
the fine edges of online and digital world by imposing mul-
tiple challenging problems/scenarios. Similar to physical
world, personal identity management is very crucial in-
order to provide any secure online system. Last decade
has seen a lot of work in this area using biometrics such as
face, fingerprint, iris etc. Still there exist several vulnerabil-
ities and one should have to address the problem of compro-
mised biometrics much more seriously, since they cannot be
modified easily once compromised. In this work, we have
proposed a secure cancelable finger dorsal template gener-
ation network (learning domain specific features) secured
via. Bio-Hashing. Proposed system effectively protects the
original finger dorsal images by withdrawing compromised
template and reassigning the new one. A novel Finger-
Dorsal Feature Extraction Net (FDFNet) has been proposed
for extracting the discriminative features. This network is
exclusively trained on trait specific features without using
any kind of pre-trained architecture. Later Bio-Hashing, a
technique based on assigning a tokenized random number
to each user, has been used to hash the features extracted
from FDFNet. To test the performance of the proposed ar-
chitecture, we have tested it over two benchmark public fin-
ger knuckle datasets: PolyU FKP and PolyU Contactless
FKI. The experimental results shows the effectiveness of the
proposed system in terms of security and accuracy.
1. Introduction
Due to the tremendous growth in automated secured sys-
tems; the security and privacy of personal information has
become one of the most critical and challenging task of the
present day world. Even the most common personnel se-
curity mechanisms like password or PINs, card and bio-
metrics have appeared to be insufficient in addressing the
challenges of identity frauds. Passwords or PINs are eas-
ily stolen and forgotten, cards are easily duplicated and lost
whereas biometric traits suffer from the privacy assault and
non-revocable issues. It simply means, if a biometric is
compromised, it is rendered worthless, just like a password
or PINs. In such circumstances, replacement of a biometric
trait with new template is not reasonable because biometrics
is permanently associated with an individual and cannot be
replaced even if compromised. Thus, to protect biometric
data from external attacks or privacy invasion, the concept
of cancelable biometrics has been introduced as depicted in
Fig.1. In particular, cancelable biometrics is a feature trans-
Figure 1. Need of cancelable biometrics
formation where instead of storing the original biometric,
it is transformed using a non-reversible function. In this
way, it is computationally difficult to reconstruct the orig-
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inal biometric from a transformed one. Several biometric
template protection schemes have been well proposed in
the literature. However in terms of comparison, biomet-
ric solutions are more reliable and successful for authenti-
cating an individual than passwords or card based mecha-
nisms because they carry unique biological information of
an individual. Hence, due to the usability merit, biomet-
rics are increasingly replacing conventional PINs, cards in
many modern security applications. One of the most popu-
lar biometric traits used in security systems are fingerprint,
iris and face. Unfortunately, they have several trait specific
drawbacks that pose limitation to their usages in low level
security applications. For instance, occlusion and reflection
affects the iris, poor quality and social acceptance related
issues for fingerprint, as well as pose, expression, and aging
for face recognition. Nevertheless, the good performance of
finger knuckle print represents a recent trend in this field.
In literature, most of the studies [8, 22] are based on
major finger-knuckle-print (FKP) as a biometric-trait. But
recently, several papers have reported systems using upper
and lower minor finger knuckle [12] and nail [13] that have
certainly shown great potential to augment FKP for bet-
ter performance. In this work, we have examined major
finger knuckle, upper minor knuckle and nail which is to-
gether coined as finger dorsal image in the literature [12]
just as a novel case study, majorly because its cancellabil-
ity has not been studied at all. However, we have experi-
mentally observed, that the proposed technique is equally
applicable to other biometric traits like iris, face or finger-
prints. The convex shape lines and creases on finger dorsal
surface are very distinctive and permanent to everyone and
are easily collectible using low-resolution imaging cameras.
These features are invariant to emotions, aging effects and
are naturally preserved to injuries and excessive usages (un-
like fingerprints) because they exist on the outer side of fin-
ger. With such tremendous benefits, it motivates us to work
over the problem of finger knuckle template protection.
Related Work: The security and privacy issues of bio-
metric templates have been emerged as an important prob-
lem, especially when the databases are centrally accessed
or networked. The various approaches on biometric tem-
plate protection have been devised since last 18 years. Out
of which, non-invertible transformation methods are more
robust and maintain recognition performance too. In this
context, the first ever work on biometric template secu-
rity was given by [6], in which they discussed some im-
portant aspects of biometrics security threats and privacy
invasion. In another study [16], the authors defined non-
invertible transformation for constructing fingerprint tem-
plates. In [15], the fingerprint minutiae based rotation and
translation invariant features were used to generate align-
ment free cancelable templates. Likewise in [19], a regis-
tration free method for constructing cancelable fingerprint
templates by using non-irreversible transformation known
as curtailed circular convolution was introduced. In [17],
authors presented an irreversible representation of fused
features of face and iris biometrics to improve the privacy
protection compared to a single feature. In another work
[18], a cancelable iris recognition system based on feature
learning and 2 stage Bio-Hashing scheme was developed.
With no pre-alignment [20], authors proposed to exploit
zoned minutia feature into non-invertible fingerprint repre-
sentation by using partial DFT(Discrete Fourier transform).
In [21], authors presented a cancelable multi-biometric sys-
tems in which fused features of fingerprint and finger vein
are transformed into common template by using enhanced
partial discrete Fourier transform. To the best of our knowl-
edge [14] is the only paper in which CNN is used to learn
robust binary representation of deep face features which are
further hashed using cryptographic method known as SHA-
3 512.
1.1. Major Concerns and Contribution
The major open issues in knuckle biometrics are the lack
of robustness against outdoor illumination, low image qual-
ity, inconsistent ROI segmentation and poor matching be-
tween weaker texture regions. To the best of our knowl-
edge, this is the first time that efforts have been made to
introduce finger dorsal modality as cancelable biometric
template, where the CNN (proposed FDFNet) based do-
main specific biometric features of a finger dorsal modal-
ity are transformed using a well known Bio-hashing tech-
nique [10]. Apart from major and minor finger knuckles,
we have worked over nail which has not been used till now.
The matching performance of our method revealed that the
obtained bio-hashed finger dorsal templates have proper-
ties like non-invertibility, diversity, and revocability to be
consider as an ideal cancelable biometric template. This
work can be regarded as a preliminary work for investigat-
ing the potential of deep-learning in generating cancelable
templates.
Figure 2. Finger knuckle image annotation (Sample image from
PolyU FKI dataset)
Model Justification : In this problem, we cannot train
a deeper CNN because we don’t have a large training data
of finger dorsal samples. Therefore, we utilized the domain
Figure 3. Finger dorsal feature extraction network (FDFNet) to learn domain specific features
knowledge to learn finger dorsal domain specific features,
so that we can get most discriminative knuckle features. In
proposed FDFNet, most of the filters in convolution layers
are fixed (non-trainable) so as to learn domain knowledge as
much as possible. This will lead to lesser trainable param-
eters only for fully connected layers. On the other hand,
if we select pre-train VGG and ResNet models to extract
features, then their fine tuning was very difficult and they
got over-fitted very soon. Hence, we have proposed a light
CNN model known as FDFNet. This model learns trait spe-
cific features using CNN filters based on local adaptive pro-
cedures such as LBP (Local Binary Patterns), BOP (Bubble
ordinal pattern) [8] etc., to improve the textural strength and
handle illumination variations.
The remainder of the article is organized into following
five main sections: Section 2 describes the proposed can-
celable biometric system which include feature extraction
n/w, data augmentation, template generation and transfor-
mation. In section 3. the experimental results are presented.
Next, we discussed on the various aspects of security anal-
ysis. Finally, conclusion is drawn in last section.
2. Proposed Methodology
With small size databases in hand it is very cumbersome
to learn the entire network from scratch without using any
kind of pre-trained architecture or model. At first, we have
extracted ROI’s of major knuckle, minor knuckle and nail
traits over PolyU FKI dataset by training a state-of-the-art
region based convolutional neural network (CNN) that use
different bounding boxes as ground truth to classify and lo-
calize the ROI’s [9]. Performance of this network, for seg-
menting images in terms of accuracy, at an overlap IOU
threshold of 0.5 is as follows:
—PolyU FKP-Major [2]: 98.92%
—PolyU FKI-Major, Minor, Nail [1]: 99.63%, 89.94%,
98.48% respectively. Since the erroneous segmentation can
severely affects the feature extraction and identification per-
formance, we have manually segmented erroneously seg-
mented images in our case. This helps us to conclusively
investigate our claim of security and cancellability without
addressing the other major issues such as segmentation or
image quality. An example of an annotated finger dorsal im-
age is shown in Fig.2. For extracting the distinctive features
from the obtained ROI’s dataset, we have trained a CNN
architecture from scratch. Since we have limited amount
of dataset with us, training a deep network that requires
lot of parameters to be learned is quite tedious. In order
to escape this situation, we have proposed STAR ordinal
pattern(SOP) and Bubble ordinal pattern (BOP) [8] based
network in conjunction with local binary convolution, an
effective surrogate to convolutional layers in standard con-
volutional neural networks(CNN). This network is inspired
from [11]. Our proposed network architecture is shown in
Fig.3.
The main reason for choosing this type of network is that
all the three patterns SOP, BOP and LBP are quite robust for
illumination variance and more-over knuckle data is having
quite good textual patterns that are well captured by them.
Secondly, the LBC(Local binary Convolutional) layer com-
prises of a set of fixed sparse pre-defined binary convolu-
tional filters that are not trainable similarly SOP and BOP
Figure 4. 1st Layer FDFNet based feature map representation
filters are not updated during the training process. This sig-
nificantly reduces the number of the learn-able parameters
in our network and thus we are able to train our network
with less data from scratch and that too without over-fitting.
We have trained this network in such a manner that it is able
to learn domain specific finger dorsal textural features.
Figure 5. Bit Map and difference map generation in FDFNet ar-
chitecture
Finger dorsal feature extraction network (FDFNet)
architecture:
1. The first layer of our convolutional FDFNet is shown
in Fig.4. It contains 12 short and wide filters having
dimensions 3× 5. The main motive of using these tall
and thin filters is the aspect ratio of our image which
is 0.5. The weights of these filters are non-trainable,
rather they are initialized in a specific pattern. Each
convolution filter is a difference filter having 1 and −1
initialized on the adjacent boundary boxes and zeros at
all other places. In total, 12 filters are obtained with
this kind of distribution. These are also known as Bub-
ble Ordinal Pattern filters. After convolving with these
12 filters, a 12 channel output is obtained. Each output
channel is known as a difference map, which on further
application of ReLU as a non-linear activation func-
tion, gives a bit-map as shown in Fig.5. Subsequently,
a 1 × 1 convolution is applied to obtain the weighted
sum of all the bit maps, generating a single channel
output which is input to the second convolutional layer.
The weights of these 1× 1 filters are trainable.
2. The second convolutional layer consists of 24 differ-
ence filters, in which first 12 filters are initialized with
1 and −1 with a gap of 2 and the remaining 12 filters
are initialized with a gap of 3.
3. Third convolutional layer consists of 36 filters and
each 12 filters are initialized with a gap of 4, 5 and
6. The single channel output of the third convolu-
tional layer is passed onto the fourth convolutional
layer which is a LBC layer consisting of 64 differ-
ence filters. The weights of these filters are also non-
trainable.
4. In a LBC layer, filters weights are randomly initialized
with 1,−1 and 0. Sparsity and Bernoulli distribution
are 2 factors which helps in governing the number of
zeros and ones in a filter. Sparsity indicates the fraction
of the zeros in the filter and Bernoulli distribution de-
termines the distribution of 1s and −1s. The 64 chan-
nel output is convolved with 64 (1×1 filters), to obtain
a single channel output. Subsequently, max pooling of
2× 2 is applied to reduce the dimension of the feature
map by half.
5. The fifth convolutional layer is also a LBC layer com-
prising of 128 difference filters and 2× 2 pooling. Af-
ter convolving with these 128 (3× 5) filters and taking
the weighted sum, max pooling is applied to obtain the
output feature map. This output feature map is flat-
tened into a single dimension feature vector which is
given as the input to the remaining 3 fully connected
layers. The dimension of the last FC layer depends
upon the number of the subjects present in the dataset.
We have designed FDFNet by logically justifying and
experimentally verifying each and every network compo-
nent. To achieve best filter response three sets of exper-
imentation with varying filter sizes have been performed
over PolyU FKP [18] dataset: (i) 3 × 3 (square filter), (ii)
combination of 3×3 and 3×5 filters and (iii) 3×5 (rectan-
gular filter) which results in (train, test) accuracy as (85%,
78%), (95%, 79%), (95%, 87%) respectively.
2.1. Data Augmentation
Data augmentation is prerequisite in our case since we
have limited amount of training samples at our disposal
and convolutional neural networks require large amount of
training data for discriminative information learning. We
perform data augmentation on each input image using Aug-
mentor library [5] of python with operations like zooming,
random distortion, illumination variation and rotation. For
each input image a total of 45 augmented images are gener-
ated.
2.2. Cancelable finger dorsal template generation
Multishot enrollment architecture for cancelable finger
dorsal biometric system is depicted in Fig.6. It is broadly
divided into three subparts. The first part (Aggregated deep
feature module) mainly deals with extracting finger dorsal
specific features. FDFNet as described in previous section
is used to extract these domain specific features. The second
subpart user token generation module is used to assign a
unique identifier to each subject while the third part deals
with generating cancelable template and its storage. Since,
we are using a deep CNN for extracting the features we go
for multishot enrollment in order to train the network and
to learn robust feature representation. We take the mean
representation of all the features corresponding to a single
subject.
Figure 6. Multishot enrollment architecture for Cancelable finger
dorsal biometric system
2.3. Transformation
One of the important property of the transformation
process is to transform the feature vector into a new space
such that the intra class similarity and inter class dissimi-
larity is preserved. For this we have used state-of-the-art
Bio-Hashing technique [10]. This process is a four step
process as follows:
Step 1: A set of pseudo-random vectors are generated
that acts as a user-specific key and stored in the database
(used during verification process) as:
ri ∈ RM |i = 1,−−−,m (1)
Step 2: Orthogonalization of pseudo-random vectors in
inner product space is done using Gram-Schmidt process
as:
r⊥i ∈ RM |i = 1,−−−,m (2)
Step 3: Next step is to project the feature vectors fi—fn
(say for n subjects) computed using FDFNet on orthonor-
mal basis computed in Step 2 by calculating the inner prod-
uct as:
[f1......fn]

r11 .......... r1m
....... ......... ......
...... ......... .......
r1n ....... rnm
 = [B1....Bm] (3)
Step 4: The resultant feature vectors obtained in Step 3
are real value feature vectors which are further thresholded
using Zero-crossing technique as :
Qi =
{
1, if Bi > 0.
0, otherwise.
(4)
2.4. Verification Architecture for Cancelable Finger
Dorsal Biometric System
Once the cancelable template is stored in the database,
the next step is to verify the claim identity of the user at the
time of verification. The steps involved in this process are
as follows:
Step 1: First the query image belonging to subject i say
imagei is passed to same FDFNet architecture to extract
deep features say fi as shown in Fig.7.
Step 2: Once the feature vector fi is obtained, as dis-
cussed in transformation section the vector Bi correspond-
ing to query image imagei is generated using Equation 3
and further binarized using Zero-crossing to generate vec-
tor Qi as discussed in Equation 4.
Step 3: The last step is to calculate the similarity mea-
sure between the resultant bit-vector and the stored bit-
vectors in our database to verify the claim identity. The
metric used for similarity measure is as follows:
‖Qi − T‖2
‖Qi‖2 + ‖T‖2
(5)
Here Qi is the bit vector corresponding to query image
in our case and T is the bit vector corresponding to different
templates stored in our database. We have used this metric
because most of the earlier proposed studies on cancelable
biometrics had already used this type of L2 similarity met-
rics [4]. Here in Fig.7 the Part 2 of the diagram is consid-
ered with binding the user-specific key with the biometric
features extracted using FDFNet while Part 3 is considered
with calculating the inner product between feature vectors
and the orthonormal feature vectors extracted from user-
specific key. Verification algorithm that verifies the claim
identity of the query image is given in algorithm 1 with de-
tailed steps.
2.5. Network Implementation Details
The proposed network has been implemented using
python and tensorflow[3] library. All the indigenous ex-
periments have been done on the same platform as Intel(R)
Xenon(R) CPU E5-2630 V4 at 2.20 GHz with 32 GB RAM
and NVIDIA Tesla K40 C GPU card with 12 GB on card
RAM.
3. Experimental Analysis and Discussions
In distinguishing experiments, the performance of pro-
posed approach has been evaluated in terms of EER (Equal
Figure 7. Verification architecture for cancelable finger dorsal
biometric system
Algorithm 1: Verification Algorithm
Input: input image q, claim identity i
Output: score s, probability by which q /∈ i
1 For the query image q first extract the ROI
corresponding to q say qROI .
2 Pass qROI to FDFNet to extract features
corresponding to it say qf and similarly pass the
template of the claimed identity i to FDFNet to
extract features say if .
3 Generate random vector corresponding to the claim
identity say ri.
4 Apply Gram Schmidt to ri to generate orthonormal
basis say r⊥i.
5 Compute the inner product between qf and r⊥i ,
similarly compute the inner product between if and
r⊥i. Let it be Q and Ti respectively.
6 Calculate the score between Q and Ti as:
‖Q− Ti‖2
‖Q‖2 + ‖Ti‖2
(6)
Score closer to 1 represents dissimilarity from the
claim identity while score closer to 0 verify the claim
identity.
Error Rate), CRR (Correct Recognition Rate) and DI (De-
cidability Index). We also show variants of EER like FAR
(False Acceptance Rate) and FRR (False Rejection Rate)
for rigorous testing. The performance metrics are computed
based on the Euclidean distance during matching with 3 dif-
ferent bit maps i.e., 32 bit, 64 bit and 128 bit.
Database Specifications : The two publicly available fin-
ger knuckle databases i.e., PolyU FKP [2], and PolyU Con-
tactless FKI [1] have been used for the analysis and valida-
tion of proposed approach. However, the images also suffer
from finger artifacts, low contrast, illumination variation,
Figure 8. ROC based performance analysis for major knuckle can-
celable biometrics
reflection, and nonrigid deformations. The PolyU FKI con-
sists of 5 finger images per subject for all the 503 classes.
While, the 6 left and 6 right finger samples from a subject
are considered belonging to separate individuals, which re-
sulted in 660 subjects. It is to be noted that, the PolyU FKI
dataset [1] has a complete finger dorsal images over which
major knuckle, minor knuckle and nail ROI’s are extracted.
While, PolyU FKP dataset [2] only provides major finger
knuckle images.
Testing Protocol : Since both of the above discussed
databases have different images and class numbers. During
testing on PolyU FKP, the first six samples per subject are
considered as gallery and the remaining six as probe. This
involves 3, 960 genuine matchings and 26, 09, 640 impostor
matching scores. On the other hand in case of PolyU FKI
database, first 3 samples per subject are selected for train-
ing and rest two for testing. Therefore, we obtain 1, 509
genuine matching scores and 7, 57, 518 impostor matching
scores.
Experiment-1 : The experimental results are shown in
Table 1. We report EER, CRR (rank-1) and DI for two
datasets with multishot enrollment. Three type of binary
bit maps with dimensions d= 32, 64, 128 are selected for
all studied cases. The Receiver Operating Characteristic
(ROC) for Major Finger Knuckle and Nail cancelable bio-
metrics are shown in Figure 8 and Figure 9 respectively.
During testing on 32 bit map PolyU FKI database, we
achieve comparative performance on major finger knuckle
and minor finger knuckle while some what lower perfor-
mance on nail biometric.
In case of 64 bit map testing, we achieve a similar trend
in overall recognition results. An EER of 0.0008% and
CRR of 100% are achieved on major finger knuckle tem-
plates, which are still better than minor finger knuckle (ERR
Table 1. Summarized results for cancelable finger knuckle biomet-
rics
Description FAR/FRR EER
(%)
CRR
(%)
DI
FKI Matching: 3 Training/ 2 Testing (PolyU FKI Data)
Major Knuckle (32
bit)
0.206/0.198 0.203 99.80 2.98
Major Knuckle (64
bit)
0.002/0 0.0008 100 4.39
Major Knuckle (128
bit)
0/0 0 100 6.30
Minor Knuckle (32
bit)
0.198/0.198 0.1984 100 3.04
Minor Knuckle (64
bit)
0.004/0 0.002 100 4.48
Minor Knuckle (128
bit)
0/0 0 100 6.30
Nail(32 bit) 0.303/0.298 0.300 99.80 3.02
Nail (64 bit) 0.006/0.101 0.003 100 4.32
Nail (128 bit) 0/0 0 100 5.75
FKP Matching: 6 Training/ 6 Testing (PolyU FKP Data )
Major FKP (32 bit) 0.071/0.101 0.089 100 2.92
Major FKP (64 bit) 0/0.02 0 100 4.40
Major FKP(128 bit) 0/0 0 100 6.01
Finger Components Fusion: (PolyU FKI Data )
Fused-1 (32 bit) 0.002/0.09 0.001 100 3.94
Fused-2 (64 bit) 0/0.099 0 100 5.70
Fused-3 (128 bit) 0/0 0 100 7.88
of 0.002 %) and nail (ERR of 0.003 %). Likewise, the per-
formance difference can be seen in terms of DI between
different bit maps.
Figure 9. ROC based Performance Analysis for Nail cancelable
Biometrics
Further, it is to be noted that the proposed approach has
surpassed all the previous cases, when tested on 128 bit
maps. One can see higher recognition results with 128 bit
map i.e., EER of 0% and CRR of 100% on each type of
finger knuckle template. In addition, the performance of
major finger knuckle print on PolyU FKP database is also
getting improved as we consider high dimension (32 bit to
128) bit maps. The ROC plot for Major Finger Knuckle
Print cancelable biometric is shown in Figure 10. From all
the tests performed in experiment 1, it can be observed from
Table 1 that: (1) In overall, major knuckle is observed to be
a best performing encoded template among nail and finger
minor. (2) Nail, which is not studied much in literature is
also proved to have better shape and textural features than
minor finger knuckle. The performance of proposed ap-
proach goes lower to higher w.r.t high dimension bitmaps
as the number of the available bits increased.
Experiment-2 : Inspired from the earlier works [17],
[21], we propose to concatenate the deep feature vectors
of major knuckle, minor knuckle and nail to quantitatively
evaluate the performance of cancelable finger dorsal bio-
metrics. This test has been performed on PolyU FKI
database with the same testing strategy. For perfect fea-
ture fusion, the real valued deep feature vectors of major
knuckle, minor knuckle and nail are first normalized to
some common range using min-max normalization tech-
nique and then fused using simplest sum rule. Subse-
quently, the deep fused feature vector is transformed to bi-
nary vector using the same criterion as discussed above in
Section 2.3. Table 1 illustrates the performance analysis
of cancelable fused finger dorsal biometrics. The fusion
performance shows superior recognition results with all bit
map templates which outperforms the category wise perfor-
mance of major knuckle, minor knuckle and nail. It implies
that the fusion of finger components improves privacy pro-
tection compared to the corresponding systems based on a
single modality. In other words, the binary hashed code
generated by fused feature vector is more discriminative,
not only in terms of recognition performance but it is more
adversarial against hashing attacks.
Security Analysis : Let Gθ be the function approxi-
mated by FDFNet, that takes Ii image corresponding to the
subject i and parameterized over θ to generate the feature
f i, as written below:
Gθ(Ii)→ f i (7)
Now, let us assume that the adversarial attacker somehow
get hold of our network Gθ. Since network G is known
the reverse mapping network G> architecture can be de-
rived by symmetric transposition of Gθ network. However,
the optimized network parameters δ of the reverse mapped
network G>δ , (where δ 6= θ) could not be estimated or
learned via. optimization techniques without having access
to the input image and its corresponding feature vectors pair
Figure 10. ROC based performance analysis for FKP cancelable
biometrics
(even if actual θ is known). In literature [7], it is well es-
tablished that the complete recoverability of original input
from the convolutional neural network got restricted due to
the presence of non-linear activation functions like Relu
andMaxpooling operations used in our architecture. How-
ever, complete recoverability of the original biometric im-
age is necessary for any kind of adversarial attack because
even “very similar” samples may led to completely differ-
ent hashes. Thus no information, about the original bio-
metric trait can be revealed. In such a scenario only brute
force attack can work which is computationally expensive
and infeasible. The proposed technique also satisfies the
revocability condition by simply changing the user-specific
key used in Bio-Hashing technique.
4. Conclusion and Future Scope
In this paper, we proposed a cancelable finger dorsal
template generation technique based on deep-feature ex-
traction using our novel architecture FDFNet and state-
of-the-art Bio-Hashing technique. Our proposed ap-
proach shows quite good results on state-of-the-art knuckle
databases namely PolyU FKP and PolyU Contactless FKI.
Like the previous existing cancelable techniques our pro-
posed architecture also offers same level of security to all
the users enrolled in the database. But often in the organiza-
tion structure different users can have different importance
depending upon the cruciality of the project one is handling.
So, for our future work, we propose to design a framework
that incorporates user importance along with its indigenous
biometric-traits also. Possible future direction also includes
testing our framework on other biometric traits like iris, fin-
gerprints and face.
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